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Rain Dances in the Dry Season 
 
Overcoming the Religious Congruence Fallacy 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Religious congruence refers to consistency among an individual’s religious beliefs and attitudes, 
consistency between religious ideas and behavior, and religious ideas, identities, or schemas that 
are chronically salient and accessible to individuals across contexts and situations.  Decades of 
anthropological, sociological, and psychological research establish that religious congruence is 
rare, but much thinking about religion presumes that it is common.  The religious congruence 
fallacy occurs when interpretations or explanations unjustifiably presume religious congruence.  
I illustrate the ubiquity of religious incongruence, show how the religious congruence fallacy 
distorts thinking about religion, and outline an approach to help overcome the fallacy. 
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RAIN DANCES IN THE DRY SEASON 
 
Overcoming the Religious Congruence Fallacy 
 
 
After reading a book or article in the scientific study of religion, I wonder if you ever find 
yourself thinking, “I just don’t believe it.”  I have this experience uncomfortably often, and I 
think it’s because of a pervasive problem in the scientific study of religion.  I want to describe 
that problem and how to overcome it. 
The problem is illustrated in a story told by Meyer Fortes.  He once asked a rainmaker in 
a native culture he was studying to perform the rainmaking ceremony for him.  The rainmaker 
refused, replying, “Don’t be a fool, whoever makes a rain-making ceremony in the dry season?” 
(Tambiah 1990:54). 
The problem is illustrated in a different way in a story told by Jay Demerath.  He was in 
Israel, visiting friends for a Sabbath dinner.  The man of the house, a conservative rabbi, stopped 
in the middle of chanting the prayers to say cheerfully: “You know, we don’t believe in any of 
this.  But then in Judaism, it doesn’t matter what you believe.  What’s important is what you do” 
(Demerath 2001:100). 
And the problem is illustrated in yet another way by the Divinity School student who told 
me not long ago that she was having second thoughts about becoming an ordained minister in the 
United Church of Christ because she didn’t believe in God.  She also mentioned that, when she 
confided this to several UCC ministers, they told her not to worry about it since not believing in 
God wouldn’t make her unusual among UCC clergy. 
These stories illustrate in different ways a problem long recognized by social 
psychologists and cultural analysts:  attitudes and behavior correlate only weakly, and collections 
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of apparently related ideas and practices rarely cohere into logically unified, mutually 
reinforcing, seamless webs (Maio et al. 2003, Swidler 1986, DiMaggio 1997, Vaisey 2009).  
Instead, ideas and practices exist as bits and pieces that come and go as situations change, 
producing many inconsistencies and discrepancies.  This is true of culture in general, and it is 
true of religious culture in particular.  Observant Jews may not believe what they say in their 
Sabbath prayers.  Christian ministers may not believe in God.  And people who regularly dance 
for rain don’t do it in the dry season. 
I will use “religious congruence” in three related senses: (1) individuals’ religious ideas 
constitute a tight, logically connected, integrated network of internally consistent beliefs and 
values; (2) religious and other practices and actions follow directly from those beliefs and values; 
and (3) the religious beliefs and values individuals express in certain, mainly religious, contexts 
are consistently held and chronically accessible across contexts, situations, and life domains.  In 
short, it can mean that religious ideas hang together, that religious beliefs and actions hang 
together, or that religious beliefs and values indicate stable and chronically accessible 
dispositions in people. 
These are not identical meanings, but I combine them in this overarching concept of 
congruence because the evidence overwhelmingly shows that people’s religious ideas, values, 
and practices generally are not congruent in any of these senses.  Rather, people’s religious ideas 
and practices generally are fragmented, compartmentalized, loosely connected, unexamined, and 
context-dependent.  This is not a controversial claim; it’s established knowledge.  But this 
established knowledge does not inform our research and thinking as centrally and deeply as it 
should.  Even though we know that cultural fragmentation is common, we often interpret our 
research findings in ways that presuppose a congruence that we know is not generally there.  
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This is the religious congruence fallacy, and it pervades the scientific study of religion.  This is 
why I often think, “I just don’t believe it,” when I read work in the scientific study of religion. 
Religious incongruence is not the same thing as religious insincerity or hypocrisy.  I am 
not saying that the rain dancer or the rabbi or the UCC clergy are religious hypocrites.  On the 
contrary, they are the heroes of this story because they illustrate something true about religion in 
general.  They don’t commit the religious congruence fallacy.  We commit the religious 
congruence fallacy when we fail to heed the lesson they teach us.   
I do three things in this article.  First, I illustrate the ubiquity of religious incongruence.  
Second, I show how conventional thinking in the scientific study of religion and beyond 
presumes just the opposite—that religious congruence is common rather than rare.  Third, I 
describe an approach aimed at reducing the religious congruence fallacy’s influence on the 
scientific study of religion. 
 
The Ubiquity of Religious Incongruence 
Ideas and practices mainly are fragmented and situational rather than congruent.  This is 
well-established knowledge in anthropology, sociology, political science, and psychology 
(Converse 1964, Evans-Pritchard 1965, Swidler 1986, D’Andrade 1995, DiMaggio 1997, Maio 
et al. 2003, Vaisey 2009).  I don’t think anyone ever has marshaled evidence to make this point 
about religion in particular, so I want to begin by describing examples and evidence illustrating 
that religion is no exception to the generalization that people’s ideas and actions do not usually 
cohere into tightly connected wholes. 
One way to see religious incongruence clearly is to examine the most instrumental-
looking ritual and religious action.  The key observation is that instrumental-looking ritual and 
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religious action usually supplements practical action, even when congruence would lead us to 
expect it to replace practical action.  Ludwig Wittgenstein articulated this point when he 
commented on James Frazer’s The Golden Bough, which exudes congruence by assuming, for 
example, that people believe that stabbing an enemy’s effigy before battle guarantees military 
success, or that morning rituals make the sun rise.  In considering these examples, Wittgenstein 
pointed out that the same person who stabs an effigy also carefully crafts and sharpens his 
weapons.  About dawn rituals he said, “The rites of dawn are celebrated by the people, but not in 
the night; rather there they simply burn lamps” (Tambiah 1990:56-58).   
E. E. Evans-Pritchard made a similar point with this example:  “[S]ome peoples put 
stones in the forks of trees to delay the setting of the sun; but the stone so used is casually picked 
up, and has only a mystical significance in, and for the purpose and duration of, the rite.  The 
sight of this or any other stone in any other situation does not evoke the idea of the setting sun.  
The association . . . is brought about by the rite, and need not in other situations arise” (1965:88-
89).  His more general point was this:  “All observers who have made lengthy first-hand studies 
of primitive peoples are agreed that [these people] are for the most part interested in practical 
affairs, which they conduct in an empirical manner, either without the least reference to supra-
sensible forces, influences, and actions, or in a way in which these have a subordinate and 
auxiliary role” (88).  Religious and practical beliefs “in reality are found in different situations 
and at different levels of experience [and] mystical representations are not necessarily aroused by 
objects outside their use in ritual situations” (88-89).  Instrumental-looking rituals and religious 
action and belief usually are performed and expressed only in specific contexts, and religious 
action almost always accompanies rather than replaces pragmatic belief and action.   
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Far from being a feature only of primitive religion, this is true wherever there is 
instrumental-looking ritual and religious action.  Many people believe in divine healing and 
actively seek it, for example, and prayers and anointing for healing, and testimony about divine 
healing, are common at Pentecostal and other worship services.  But very few people seek divine 
healing instead of medical treatment--unless, of course, they don’t have access to quality medical 
care (Poloma 1989:54-60; Wacker 2001:27, 191).  Divine healing testimonies often contain the 
exclamation, “The doctors were amazed!”, again indicating that healing prayers and rituals 
mainly supplement rather than replace medical care, just as superstitious athletes can believe that 
rituals or talismans improve their play while they also train and practice incessantly.  People all 
the time pray for health or wealth or victory in battle, and such instrumental-looking religious 
action may look like dancing for rain in the dry season.  But the fact that such action almost 
always supplements rather than replaces practical action shows otherwise. 
Incongruence also is evident in ritual and religious action that is not instrumental.  Here, 
the telling fact is that the realities expressed in rituals, the beliefs and attitudes that people 
express outside of ritual, and the practical realities of peoples’ everyday lives usually only 
loosely connect with one another.   
One of my favorite ritual analyses is Barbara Myerhoff’s (1978) account of a graduation 
ceremony at a Jewish senior citizens center in Venice, California.  The graduation ceremony 
marked the completion by 26 elderly Jews of a five-month course in Yiddish history.  In this 
instance, the relationship between the ritual content and the participants’ everyday lives was 
closer to outright contradiction than to congruence.  Most poignantly, the ceremony celebrated 
the love and honor bestowed on these senior citizens by their children and grandchildren.  The 
ceremony portrayed the graduates as having “realized their most cherished ideals in life by 
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producing children who were educated, successful, and devoted to them” (106).  One speaker 
said this to the gathered crowd:  “How proud you must be of your parents and grandparents this 
day.  How you can rejoice over them. . . You, the children they have produced, are their greatest 
accomplishment, and you are here to show them you understand what they have done” (94).  But 
the audience contained almost no children or grandchildren of the graduates.  And a major, 
excruciating, part of these people’s everyday lives was their feeling of being neglected and 
unappreciated by their highly successful but rarely visiting progeny. 
In this way, and in other ways, this ritual was “built upon contradictions, denials, and 
fictions” (86).   It disguised rather than reflected everyday realities.  None of this is to say that 
this was an unsuccessful or inauthentic ritual, or that it produced no solidarity or positive 
emotional energy.  By any reasonable standard it was a highly successful event, and the 
contradictions do not diminish that success.  How rituals work their magic and achieve success is 
a subject for another day.  Here, the point is that it is not because they connect tightly, 
coherently, and literally to the beliefs, attitudes, and practices evident in people’s lives outside 
the ritual. 
Myerhoff analyzed a one-time, unique ritual rather than a regularly occurring event that 
has been polished over the years, but religious incongruence clearly is not limited to one-time 
events.  Timothy Nelson was struck that a poor black congregation held long, emotionally 
intense worship services emphasizing love of one’s fellow Christians while, outside of worship, 
members often expressed distrust, harsh criticism, and negative feelings about each other 
(Nelson 2005:135, 182-86).  Cheryl Townsend Gilkes described a church service characterized 
by “extreme emotionalism” in which “men and women scream and cry and leap about.  Bodies 
seem to be wracked by uncontrollable spasms of both grief and joy.  People, both young and old, 
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leap about in the aisles, dance at the altar, and fall out on the floor . . . Choir members who ‘fall 
out’ during the performance are supported by other choir members [and choirs sing] six or seven 
choruses of a song until the lead singer regains consciousness in order that she may finish the 
song with the choir properly” (1980:38-39).  Gilkes goes on:  “No matter how severe the 
pandemonium within the church service, I have never witnessed a church service in which every 
single person’s episode of ‘getting happy’ or ‘shouting’ was not resolved, worked through, or 
finished before the singing of the final hymn and the recessional.  When the participants leave, 
they usually appear as unruffled as they did when they came into the church” (39).  Grant 
Wacker made the same point about white Pentecostals, who, he says, “almost certainly fell into 
physiologically disassociative states but . . . they also knew exactly how and when to enter and 
leave those states” (Wacker 2001:56).  On the other end of the social and religious spectrum, 
only two-thirds of church-going Episcopalians say that they know that God exists, but the other 
third still say, “Our Father, who art in heaven,” at the appropriate moment in the liturgy.  
Religious action—instrumental or not—is highly situational. 
Religious behavior is not the only type of behavior that is strongly situation dependent.  
Steven Hitlin said this in his 2008 book on the social psychology of conscience:  “Decades of 
social psychological research can be boiled down to one insight: if we want to predict someone’s 
behavior, we are better off knowing where they are rather than who they are” (Hitlin 2008:93).  
Erving Goffman would not have been surprised by this, and the power of the situation applies in 
spades to religion.  Religious ideas generally are activated in people’s minds only situationally, 
and religious action, including the act of expressing religious beliefs or attitudes, mainly is 
bounded and situational.  To quote Evans-Pritchard again, the associations that people make 
among religious ideas and actions occur “only when evoked in specific ritual situations, which 
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are also of limited duration” (1965:29).  David Smilde recently drew the same conclusion from 
his study of Venezuelan evangelicals:  “[I]n most contexts the religious laity have a repertoire of 
meanings that are marshaled for specific situations.  This repertoire will not normally be 
rationalized but rather will contain numerous mutually incompatible meanings that are 
inconsistently used” (Smilde 2007:125).  And the authors of a 2008 Science article reached the 
same conclusion after reviewing research on the relationship between religiosity and prosocial 
behavior:  When it comes to predicting prosocial behavior, “the religious situation is more 
important than the religious disposition” (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008:62, my emphasis). 
Examples of religious incongruence could be multiplied endlessly.  We see it across 
religions, cultures, historical periods, and social contexts.  Franz Boas described a successful 
Indian shaman who did not believe in his own powers (Palmer and Steadman 2004:140).  The 
Maasai people describe God concretely and anthropomorphically during their rituals, but they 
speak much more abstractly when asked in conversation what they believe about God (Olsson 
1999), which makes them a lot like American churchgoers.  Maine lobster fishermen “observed 
taboos that they denied believing in [and] failed to observe taboos in which they professed 
belief” (Palmer and Steadman 2004:140).  Mary Jo Neitz interviewed a Wiccan priest who told 
her that it doesn’t matter whether he believes that his rituals work; what matters is doing them 
(Neitz 2004:400). People who claim to be born-again or evangelical Christians are no less likely 
than others to endorse certain ideas they ought to be hostile to, such as reincarnation, channeling, 
or astrology (Gallup and Lindsay 1999:40).  Among respondents to the General Social Survey, 
conservative Protestants are no less likely than other Protestants to have been divorced, to have 
seen an X-rated movie in the last year, or to be sexually active even if they aren’t married.  And 
the reality of decision-making and economic responsibility in evangelical families is very far 
11 
 
from the ideals these same people espouse about the husband being the head of the household 
(Gallagher and Smith 1999). 
But my primary goal is not to persuade you that religious incongruence is common.  As I 
mentioned earlier, the ubiquity of cultural incongruence in general, and religious incongruence in 
particular, is an established, uncontroversial fact.  My primary goal is to persuade you that this 
established knowledge should more centrally and deeply inform our work.  Despite knowing that 
religious congruence is rare, we often forget this in practice. 
 
Presuming Congruence Rather than Incongruence 
How does the religious congruence fallacy shape the scientific study of religion?  Most 
obviously, the religious congruence fallacy has inspired a search for religious influence on 
behavior that religious congruence implies should be there, and the most common form in which 
the religious congruence fallacy appears is when we explain behavior by connecting it to 
religious affiliations, practices, or beliefs that seem consistent with it and from which the 
behavior is thought to derive.  But decades of research devoted to proving that religiosity is 
consequential in ways that congruence implies has produced a confusing hodge-podge of mixed 
results.  This should not be surprising.  Mixed results are exactly what we should expect if 
religious incongruence is ubiquitous. 
Mixed results appear whether we look at religiosity’s connections with health, political 
behaviors, sexual behavior, prosocial behaviors, antisocial behaviors, or other outcomes.  
Religiosity, for example, seems related to positive health outcomes in the United States but not 
in Europe (King 2009).  Another example:  Evangelical Protestant pregnant teenagers are less 
likely than mainline Protestants to abort (controlling for other things), but Catholics are not—and 
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girls in religious schools are more likely to abort than girls in public schools (Adamczyk 2009).  
After reviewing the literature on the connections between religion and prejudice and religion and 
deviance, Robin Perrin concluded that “religiosity effects are not as significant as common 
wisdom and social scientific theory might suggest” (Perrin 2000:537).  And decades of 
psychological research looking for behavioral consequences of intrinsic religiosity has yielded 
the conclusion that intrinsically religious people do not act in more pro-social ways than anyone 
else, but they think they do, or should, or would, so their behavioral self-reports often are 
different from those of other people even when their behavior is not (Trimble 1997; Batson and 
Powell 2003; Leach et al. 2008). 
I do not have space to describe as many examples of mixed results as I would like, but I 
want to highlight one particularly compelling example.  A very common finding in the scientific 
study of religion is that theological beliefs relate to other beliefs and actions in different, 
sometimes opposite, ways for African Americans than for whites.  Controlling for other things, 
theologically conservative whites are more politically conservative than theologically liberal 
whites, but the opposite is true for African Americans (Greeley and Hout 2006: Chapter 4).  
White conservative Protestants are more individualistic when they think about inequality, but the 
opposite is true for African Americans (Emerson and Smith 2000:97).  Theologically 
conservative white congregations are less socially engaged than theologically liberal white 
congregations, but the opposite is true among African American congregations (Tsitsos 2007).   
Among white adolescents, religiosity (though not evangelicalism) is associated with delayed 
sexual activity, but “this is much less true for African Americans” (Regnerus 2007:152).  White 
conservative Protestants give more to their churches than other Protestants and Catholics do, but 
black conservative Protestants do not give more to their churches even though their religious 
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beliefs and attitudes are essentially the same as white conservative Protestants (Keister 
2008:1260-61). 
This very common finding—religious beliefs and attitudes relate differently to other 
beliefs and behaviors for whites than they do for blacks—is decisive evidence of religious 
incongruence, and it alone should make us reluctant to explain religious and other behavior by 
connecting that behavior to religious affiliations, practices, and beliefs from which the behavior 
is thought to logically derive.  If congruence between religious beliefs and other beliefs and 
behaviors in fact produced the correlations we observe among whites, the same correlations 
should appear among African Americans when other relevant variables are controlled.  But they 
do not.  We know this, but we have not appreciated its theoretical significance: religious 
incongruence is ubiquitous, and it usually will be a mistake to connect religiosity to what look 
like logically related outcomes.  Almost every claim of the form, “People act in a certain way 
because they are in a particular religion or because they attend religious services or because they 
hold this or that religious belief,” commits the religious congruence fallacy. 
It always is possible to develop interpretations that account for a complex pattern of 
mixed results.  But the complicated interpretations that are required to account for mixed results 
in the study of religion remind me of the epicycles that Ptolemaic astronomers posited to make 
the facts about how planets moved in the sky consistent with an earth-centered cosmology.  
Positing that planets moved in complex loops—epicycles—made the observations consistent 
with an earth-centered cosmology.  But these epicycles’ complexity now seems a clear sign that 
something was fundamentally wrong with the ideas behind them.  Similarly, research results 
filled with apparent contradictions that require interpretations loaded with caveats and exceptions 
and nuances should lead us to consider the possibility that something is wrong with our basic 
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ideas.  I think what is wrong is the presumption of religious congruence.  The religious 
congruence fallacy leads us to search for causal effects we should not be searching for, it leads us 
to make claims about religious causality we should not make, and it leads us to posit epicycles to 
save the religious congruence assumption from evidence that contradicts it. 
The quantitative search for “religious effects” is particularly vulnerable to the religious 
congruence fallacy, but this fallacy is not reducible to unjustified causal inference in quantitative 
work.  It occurs commonly in both quantitative and qualitative research.  Its telltale sign in 
quantitative research is a regression model in which the coefficients attached to religious service 
attendance, religious belief, or religious affiliation are interpreted causally.  Its telltale sign in 
qualitative work is when beliefs or attitudes that a researcher hears in the field are treated as 
stable dispositions presumed to be equally salient across situations, when people’s accounts of 
how their actions are rooted in their beliefs and values are treated as causal explanations of those 
actions, or when the coherent stories we all try to tell about ourselves are presumed to reflect real 
congruence in our everyday lives.  Congruence is a suspect explanation of behavior whether it is 
imputed by an analyst or produced by an interviewee.  The religious congruence fallacy is 
conceptual, not methodological, so the difference between a survey and an in-depth interview is 
not fundamental; nor is the difference between a regression equation and a qualitative analysis.  
In either case, if expressions of religiosity are taken to indicate stable, pan-situational, 
dispositions with logically clear causal connections to other beliefs or to actions, then the 
religious congruence fallacy lurks. 
The interpretive problem I am emphasizing is not unique to religion.  Similar issues arise 
when thinking about the meaning of gender and race effects.  But the congruence fallacy is 
particularly problematic in the scientific study of religion because interpretations that rest on 
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congruent beliefs and ideologies more readily come to mind when we think about religion than 
when we think about gender or race or other independent variables, so it is particularly easy for 
scholars of religion to fall back on congruence as a default interpretation, even when they 
shouldn’t. 
I want to be clear about something I am not saying.  I am not saying that religious 
congruence is impossible.  I am saying that it is rare, and much conventional practice does not 
appreciate how rare it is.  Religious congruence is rare because achieving it in a specific situation 
requires one or more of three conditions. 
Congruence can be achieved through conscious cognitive effort.  We can analyze our 
different ideas’ relations to each other and to action, and we can try to reduce recognized 
inconsistencies.  But this does not come naturally, and it is hard to do.  That is why it is rare. 
Congruence also can be achieved through social rather than cognitive effort.  I can 
consult a religious leader about what my religion demands in a specific situation, and I can act 
according to his advice, thereby achieving congruence through deference to an authority.  
Congruence also can be achieved socially through immersion in a homogeneous religious culture 
or through intense involvement with an all-encompassing group.  But this sort of deference to 
religious authority or enveloping religious culture is unusual.  Mark Regnerus studied religious 
influence on teenage sexuality, but I think he makes a point that is more generally true when he 
says that religious influence occurs only when people are embedded in a “a network of like-
minded friends, family, and authorities,” and that such embeddedness is “relatively rare, 
[encompassing only] a small segment of American adolescents, excluding even most religious 
adolescents” (Regnerus 2007:203-4).  Sacred canopies exist, but they are rare. 
16 
 
A third, and probably more important, way that religious congruence can be achieved is 
through experience that forges internalized, automatic responses to situations so that religious 
schemas spring automatically to mind in certain situations.  When internalized responses or 
schemas are firmly in place, religious congruence can occur without cognitive effort or social 
control.  Internalization promotes what social psychologists call heuristic processing and what 
cognitive psychologists call connectionist or parallel processing.  Whatever the labels, the basic 
idea is the same: some human information processing is “implicit, unverbalized, rapid, and 
automatic, [and some is] explicit, verbalized, slow, and deliberate” (D’Andrade 1995:180).  
Internalization promotes the former. 
Internalization is the most powerful route to congruence, but it too is difficult to achieve.  
Roy D’Andrade (1995:144) notes that there is a trade-off between how easy it is to learn a 
schema and how deeply that schema is internalized.  Serial or systematic learning--the 
proposition-based, verbal kind of learning--is relatively easy.  But the knowledge gained through 
serial learning is difficult to internalize in ways that allow it to shape our behavior without 
having to go through the laborious process of calling content to mind and consciously deciding 
what it implies about action in a particular situation.  Learning that leads to heuristic or 
connectionist processing, on the other hand, usually is much more time-consuming.  It can 
require hundreds or even thousands of experiential repetitions--not, importantly, mere verbal 
repetitions--to make a response to a situation automatic and largely unconscious. 
To use D’Andrade’s example, an American traveling in England learns very quickly that 
they drive on the left over there.  This is explicit, conscious learning, and it is relatively easy.  
But it takes much longer to do the correct thing automatically when you come to a roundabout or 
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cross a street.  Habitual knowledge about driving on the left comes only from many driving 
experiences.  Reading the guidebook 1,000 times won’t help. 
Repeated experience is one route to internalization, but internalized, automatic responses 
do not always require hundreds of repetitions to create.  Anyone who feels queasy at the smell of 
food with which they once had a bad experience knows that.  But intense experiences that can 
create this sort of automatic stimulus-response connection are difficult to create and control.  
Whether internalization occurs through many repeated experiences or through a single intense 
experience, it is a kind of learning that requires special circumstances.   
The religious congruence fallacy often amounts to assuming that religious beliefs and 
attitudes combine the easy learnability of self-consciously acquired knowledge with the easy 
causal influence of internalized, automatic knowledge.  We imagine that, because religious 
people hear hundreds of sermons connecting religious faithfulness with, say, caring for the poor, 
or hear many exemplary religious stories about caring for the poor, or participate in many rituals 
in which caring for the poor is emphasized, religious people therefore will be more likely to help 
the poor when given the opportunity to do so outside the religious setting.  This model of 
religious influence assumes that systematic learning--the explicit, verbal, kind of learning--
produces internalized connections that we then act on more or less automatically.  But religious 
schemas do not become chronically accessible and influential because they are memorable, 
commonly enacted in rituals, or repeated often in religious narratives.  Internalized religious 
schemas that produce automatic responses in other settings are unlikely to form without repeated 
experiences in religious settings that are reproduced more or less exactly in other settings.  
People generally need many experiences akin to really driving on the left to forge the relevant 
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internalized responses.  Neither repeated exposure to relevant narratives nor repeated 
participation in rituals is enough to generate automatic processing. 
It is important to emphasize religion’s situational specificity again here.  Repeated 
religious practice clearly establishes many deeply internalized responses in people.  But because 
religious practice mainly is situation specific, the automatic responses it produces also mainly 
will be situation specific.  A lifetime of Easter services or Passover Seders or Ramadan fasting or 
rosary praying surely establishes powerful, persuasive, long-lasting moods and motivations 
specifically regarding Easter or Passover or Ramadan or the rosary, but these internalized 
connections do not necessarily extend beyond Easter or Passover or Ramadan or the rosary.  A 
lifetime of weekly churchgoing surely establishes internalized responses to certain hymns or 
stories or rituals or practices, but these internalized responses do not necessarily extend beyond 
the religious setting.  A single emotionally intense experience at a youth camp may well produce 
a lifetime association by which someone is brought to tears whenever they hear a particular song, 
but that internalized response does not necessarily extend beyond that very specific association.  
This is why the causal influence of religious ideas or practices rarely extends beyond the 
religious domain.  Even when people have internalized a religious schema, it exists in our brains 
along with many other schema.  To influence behavior in a given situation, it is not enough for a 
religious schema to be internalized.  It also has to become activated in that situation. 
So religious congruence obviously exists, but it requires substantial cognitive effort, 
intense and consistent social reinforcement, or internalization.  The systematic learning we do in 
religious contexts does not generally produce automatic religious responses, and the 
internalizations that religious people forge through religious practice generally stay confined to 
religious contexts.  To paraphrase a recent slogan enticing people to visit Las Vegas, what 
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happens in church mainly stays in church. This is why we commit the religious congruence 
fallacy almost every time we explain behavior by connecting it to religious affiliations, practices, 
or beliefs that seem consistent with it. 
Another way that a presumption of religious congruence shapes the literature occurs 
when we consider congruence, or the drive towards congruence, to be religion’s defining feature.  
Clifford Geertz defined religion like this, but it is a misleading way to think about religion.  It 
encourages us to overlook the fact that, in everyday life, the powerful, persuasive, long-lasting 
moods and motivations associated with religion usually are specific and situation-dependent 
rather than general.  And even the impulse to strive for congruence varies considerably across 
and within religions.  An impulse towards this-worldly ethical rationalization is central to some 
kinds of Christianity, a point that Max Weber famously emphasized, but it is not central to all 
religions, and it is not uniformly central within Christianity.  To mention just one classic 
example, surely not atypical, of Christianity without this impulse, Liston Pope observed in his 
1942 classic, Millhands and Preachers, that, to clergy and members of “uptown churches,” “the 
private life of church members was none of the minister’s business . . . For uptown people, 
religion — well, it’s just religion — which is to say, it is a set of actionways and thoughtways 
associated with, and largely confined to, the church, with the minister as exemplar and chief 
practitioner” (93).  Some religious leaders and people strive for religious congruence, but not all 
do.  Striving for congruence is not an essential feature of religion—unless we declare it such by 
definition. 
The religious congruence fallacy is widespread in the scientific study of religion, but it 
also reverberates more widely.  Indeed, attributing an unwarranted coherence to people’s 
religious ideas and practices may be the single most important misunderstanding about religion 
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among the general public.  It is behind both unrealistic popular idealizations of religion and 
unjustified popular demonizations of religion. 
The Bush Administration’s faith-based initiative is a recent example of an unrealistic 
popular idealization of religion.  I was once at a meeting at which Catholic Charities executives, 
who also were nuns, were told by faith-based initiative advocates that a new day had dawned and 
they no longer needed to keep religious content out of their programs.  They now had the green 
light to infuse their programs with religion.  But the executives were puzzled by this.  They 
asked, “Why would we want to infuse our programs with religion?”  The faith-based initiative 
was based in part on the conviction that it is sensible to do rain dances in the dry season, but it 
also was based on the conviction that religious people generally believe that it’s sensible to dance 
for rain in the dry season, and so they would welcome the invitation to do so.  Most leaders of 
religious social services agencies know better, which is one reason the faith-based initiative went 
basically nowhere. 
The religious congruence fallacy also underlies unjustified demonizations of particular 
religions.  Western commentators commonly portray Islamic societies and Moslem people as 
societies and people in which religious and political beliefs are fused into a coherent whole that 
produces authoritarianism and extremism.  But surveys of the Islamic world show that, despite 
considerable uniformity within and among Islamic countries in basic religious beliefs, there is 
considerable variation on many important social and political issues (Moaddel 2007:7).  
Moreover, like people everywhere, citizens of Islamic countries are “simultaneously and 
sincerely attached to values that clash,” such as agreeing that “a good government is the one that 
makes law according to people’s wishes, while at the same time [agreeing] that a good 
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government implements only the shari’a laws” (Moaddel 2007:11).  If we understood better the 
ubiquity of religious incongruence we might be less likely to demonize other religions. 
The religious congruence fallacy also infects “new atheist” critiques of religion.  
Christopher Hitchens’ nearly 300-page attack on religion contains many irrefutable criticisms, 
but some of these criticisms are compelling only as criticisms of religion that strives for 
excessive congruence rather than as criticisms of religion in general.  Like many others both 
inside and outside the academy, Hitchens incorrectly considers this drive a defining feature of 
religion:  Religion, he says, “must seek to interfere with the lives of nonbelievers, or heretics, or 
adherents of other faiths.  It may speak about the bliss of the next world, but it wants power in 
this one” (Hitchens 2007:17, original emphasis).  And: “religion is ultimately incapable of 
[leaving unbelievers alone].  As I write these words, and as you read them, people of faith are in 
their different ways planning your and my destruction, and the destruction of all the hard-won 
human attainments that I have touched upon” (13).  This is wrong, and it is wrong because it 
treats the drive for congruence as the defining feature of religion. 
Daniel Dennett’s analysis of religion is more subtle, but it too relies on the religious 
congruence fallacy.  Dennett (2006, chapter 8) correctly observes that most people do not act 
fully consistently with their religious beliefs.  This is just another way to say that religious 
incongruence is common.  But he draws the wrong conclusion from this observation.  He says 
that people who do not act according to their professed religious beliefs, and people who talk 
about their religion differently in a ritual context than they do in casual conversation, act as 
though they do not really believe in God, even though they say they do.  What such people really 
believe, he says, is that it is a good thing to profess belief in God even if you do not really 
believe in God.  As he put it in an interview, “many people who profess belief in God do not 
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really act the way people who believe in God would act; they act the way people would act who 
believed in believing in God” (Floyd 2000).  This is misleading.  I would say that such people act 
the way competent social actors act:  whatever they do or do not believe, they talk and act 
differently in different situations.  Dennett’s response to religious inconsistency is to declare 
“gotcha!” because he thinks religious incongruence is equivalent to religious confusion.  But 
something is wrong with an analysis that leads to the conclusion that almost no one really 
believes in God.  What’s wrong is forgetting that, like other action, the appropriateness of 
religious action, including the action of professing religious belief, depends on the situation.  
Dennett surely knows this is true of action in general, but he commits the religious congruence 
fallacy by forgetting that it also is true of religious action. 
 
Overcoming the Religious Congruence Fallacy 
How might we overcome the religious congruence fallacy?  Obviously, we should 
hesitate to treat religious beliefs as stable dispositions, we should hesitate to explain behavior by 
connecting it to religious affiliations, practices, or beliefs from which the behavior seems to 
follow, and we should try to better understand the conditions under which religious congruence 
really does emerge.  But I want to go beyond these obvious implications. 
I also want to go beyond the usual response to the problem of religious incongruence 
among cultural sociologists and anthropologists, which is to limit attention to practices, 
narratives, material objects, and other directly observable cultural objects that are external to 
people’s minds.  As Paul Lichterman recently described this intellectual development, “Rather 
than gauging private beliefs, recent works advocate for investigating religious vocabularies and 
forms of self-presentation that we can see and hear in everyday life, and seeing what actions 
23 
 
accompany them” (Lichterman 2008:84).  Mary Jo Neitz characterized this turn as one that 
“moves us away from thinking of religion primarily in terms of beliefs and rules, and towards 
thinking in terms of practices” (Neitz 2004:399).  The anthropologists Craig Palmer and Lyle 
Steadman have gone even farther, calling for replacing wholesale the study of religious belief 
with the study of religious language (Palmer and Steadman 2004).  We have learned much from 
research inspired by this turn away from mental states and towards directly observable cultural 
objects like discourse and practices.  But we also lose something, especially in the study of 
religion.  As Robert Wuthnow put it, “Religion is, after all, centrally concerned with beliefs and 
convictions [and] with the ways in which meaning and purpose are constructed . . . To avoid 
focus on these aspects of religion would be like trying to understand apple pie without paying 
attention to apples” (1997:253).  Wuthnow aimed this barb at approaches that ignored religious 
culture in general, but it also applies to approaches to religious culture that avoid grappling with 
mental states. 
This strikes close to home for me because ignoring belief and other mental states has 
been my own response to the fact of religious incongruence.  This is why I conceptualized 
secularization as the declining scope of religious authority rather than declining religion.  This is 
why I studied rules about women’s ordination rather than female religious leaders.  This is why I 
was drawn to the National Congregations Study, a study of organizational characteristics and 
collective practices.  Much like those who respond to the incongruence problem by turning away 
from the study of belief and conviction to the study of language and practices, I turned away 
from the study of belief to the study of religion’s social organization.  I believed that religious 
incongruence implied that we could make little scientific progress by studying religious mental 
states. 
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But I have changed my mind about this, and I want to outline an approach that neither 
naively ignores the religious congruence problem nor turns completely away from the study of 
mental states.  I seek middle ground in another sense as well:  I have criticized conventional 
practice in ways similar to how constructionist or interpretive scholars might criticize it, but I do 
not respond to this problem by abandoning a truly scientific study of religion. 
So, how might we overcome the religious congruence fallacy?  First, anyone who offers 
an explanation that presumes religious congruence should bear a heavier burden of proof.  In an 
ideal world, this would mean that such explanations would establish that the unusual conditions 
necessary for religious congruence exist in the situation at hand.  If we want to claim religious 
internalization, we would have to show that people have had enough relevant, reinforcing 
religious experiences to forge an internalized connection strong enough to produce an automatic 
habitual response in a particular situation.  We might call this the “would they refuse to eat it” 
standard of proof since several paradigm examples of truly internalized automatic religious 
responses involve food: Orthodox Jews and Muslims not eating pork, Seventh-day Adventists 
not eating meat, Hindus not eating beef, and so on.  The religious congruence fallacy sometimes 
amounts to treating a connection between some sort of religion and some sort of behavior as if it 
were analogous to Orthodox Jews not eating pork.  But this analogy is not apt for most of what 
we study.  It seems unlikely, for example, that evangelical Protestants have automatic, 
internalized reactions to pornography or premarital sex, or that Catholics have automatic 
reactions to abortion, that are analogous to Orthodox Jews’ reactions to pork.  In an ideal world, 
researchers whose explanations rely on internalization would establish that the connections they 
posit meet this standard and are activated in relevant decision-making situations.  Similarly, in an 
ideal world, if someone thinks that religious congruence is achieved through conscious cognitive 
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processing or social control, then that person would be expected to establish that such conscious 
processing really is happening at key decision-making moments or that effective social control 
really does exist.  If human action involves a mix of habit and creativity, then, in an ideal world, 
claims that religion influences action would be accompanied by evidence that religion really did 
shape the relevant habits or really does inform our creativity at decision-making moments. 
That’s the ideal world.  In the real world—where assistant professors need to publish 
papers even when relevant evidence is hard to come by, and where reviewers and editors require 
us to tell stories about correlations between religiosity and other things—shifting the burden of 
proof might mean that those who offer claims presuming congruence should be required to write 
a sentence something like this:  “I know that religious congruence is very unusual, but here’s 
why my case should be considered an exception.”  And the ensuing justification should say how 
congruence has been achieved in this case.  This justification needs to persuade us that people 
really had many experiences akin to driving on the left, or really consciously reflect on religion 
at decision-making moments, or really live in a setting with effective religious social control.  
Neither correlations nor official ideologies nor elite discourse nor ritual practice nor narrative 
content nor people’s post-hoc interpretations of their actions will help much in making this case.  
And if it seems unlikely that enough people would have had enough relevant experiences to 
forge the necessary specific internalizations, or if it seems unlikely that the relevant 
internalizations, if they exist, would be activated in key situations, and if neither explicit 
intellectual effort nor effective social control seems likely, then we should recognize that 
religiosity is unlikely to be the causal force it may at first appear to be.   
I do not want to abandon religion as an individual-level independent variable, but I do 
want us to less quickly resort to religious congruence mechanisms when we think about religious 
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causality.  I am not saying that we should stop telling stories about our correlations or our field 
observations.  We have to tell stories about our results.  But I am saying that we should hesitate 
to tell stories that presume religious congruence, and we should expect those who tell such 
stories to justify them.  Shifting the burden of proof in this way will help us overcome the 
religious congruence fallacy because the implausibility of most explanations that presume 
congruence will become apparent when the alleged congruence mechanisms are made explicit. 
Second, we might take seriously mental states other than beliefs.  The attempt to find 
connections between internalized religion and various outcomes has focused overwhelmingly on 
religious beliefs.  But beliefs are just one kind of mental state.  We also have perceptions, 
expectations, feelings, wishes, attitudes, and intentions, all of which might shape action.  
Unconscious mental states also shape action.  Social psychologists tell us that, when compared 
with attitudes and behavioral intentions, beliefs, especially general beliefs, are the least 
predictive of behavior (Lord 1997:235-249).  So focusing on belief as the religious mental state 
par excellence makes us particularly vulnerable to the religious congruence fallacy.  Examining 
religiously relevant mental states other than belief also will connect us more effectively to other 
literatures, such as the medical literature on placebo effects, which work mainly through 
expectations (Stewart-Williams and Podd 2004), or the vast psychological literature on priming, 
which shows that unconscious mental states shape behavior. 
Third, we might pay more attention to decision-making situations.  An internalized 
religious schema does not necessarily produce religious influence; that schema also has to be 
activated in a specific decision-making situation.  We might investigate what features of 
situations activate religious schema in people.  The psychological literature on priming could 
help here.  Does religious jewelry or clothing prime religious ideas?  How about seeing a 
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religious building on the corner, or being in the presence of people we first met in a religious 
setting?  Do religious objects bring religious ideas to mind and therefore influence decisions 
made in the presence of religious material culture?  In the search for individual-level effects of 
religion, situations may be better units of analysis than individuals. 
Fourth, we might look harder for short-term causal effects of religion on individuals.  
Experimental research consistently finds that bringing certain identities or norms or expectations 
to mind at the moment of decision-making changes behavior, but these behavioral changes often 
are situational and short-term.  Dan Ariely’s research on cheating has shown that if people are 
reminded of the Ten Commandments immediately before they have an opportunity to cheat or 
steal, they are less likely to cheat or steal right at that moment (Ariely 2008:206-08).  But they 
are no less likely to cheat or steal the next day, and being a generally religious person does not 
change that (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008).  Lest we are tempted to commit the religious 
congruence fallacy in interpreting the Ten Commandments effect, the same reduction in cheating 
occurs if people engage in any sort of explicit moral reflection, religious or secular--or, for that 
matter, if they look in a mirror--immediately before being given an opportunity to cheat.  The 
short-term, situational causal mechanisms found by social psychologists, cognitive scientists, and 
behavioral economists contrast sharply with the chronic, dispositional causal force that we often 
impute to religious ideas and practices. 
Fifth, we might pay more attention to medium-term causal effects.  We often do 
laboratory experiments that detect causal mechanisms operating in seconds and minutes, and we 
now do long-term panel studies looking for evidence of causal mechanisms operating over years.  
But we do not often look for evidence of causal mechanisms that operate on the order of hours or 
days or weeks or months.  There are research designs--for example, from the world of program 
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evaluation--aimed at finding causal effects on a time scale of days or weeks or months, but such 
designs are underused in the study of religion.  We should give higher priority to investigating, 
say, whether attending church on Sunday morning makes you act any differently literally on 
Sunday afternoon than to investigating whether generally attending church makes you generally 
act any differently.  Religious incongruity implies that many common causal mechanisms 
involving religion probably operate in the short- and medium-term. 
Sixth, when we find short- or medium-term causal effects we might ask how quickly they 
decay.   Does participating in a religious ritual or worship service change your behavior one hour 
later?  If so, is the effect still there two hours later?  Six hours later?  The next day?  The next 
week?  If people act differently when in the presence of a Bible or a WWJD bracelet or a copy of 
the Ten Commandments, how long does that difference last after they put down the Bible, take 
off the bracelet, or turn away from the wall displaying the Commandments?  If you act 
differently when you first wear a WWJD bracelet, how long does it take before that effect wears 
off, and the bracelet becomes just another piece of mundane jewelry?  When we find short- and 
medium-term effects, we should investigate their duration or half-life. 
There are two related themes running through these suggestions.  First, we should move 
towards a more deeply situational model of religious influence.  We know well that religiosity is 
multidimensional, but we might better appreciate that most religion also is situational both in its 
everyday expression and in its everyday causal impact on individuals.  Second, we should base 
our explanations and interpretations on accurate psychology. 
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Conclusion 
My message is a simple one.  We know that religious congruence is rare, so we should 
not expect to find it under every steeple, yet this knowledge does not inform our thinking and our 
practice as centrally as it should. 
There is an irony here.  I would like practice in the scientific study of religion to be more 
congruent with our knowledge, but I want us to more congruently apply our knowledge about 
how hard it is to be congruent! 
There is an irony here, but not a contradiction.  I want to leave you with the thought that 
the scientific study of religion can be an exception to the general rule that cultural systems are 
not congruent.  As I have emphasized, congruence can be achieved, but only under special 
circumstances.  The scientific study of religion, like any healthy scientific culture, can achieve 
more congruence than usually is possible in other domains because we work within institutions 
that promote congruence: peer review, publicly accessible data, forums for open debate, training 
programs in which students repeatedly have experiences that we hope create the right kind of 
internalized intellectual habits, and moments like this when we reflect together on our 
assumptions and on the relationship between our assumptions and our practices.  The congruence 
that is realistically achievable within well functioning scientific communities is not usually 
achievable elsewhere because the social arrangements and institutions that promote congruence 
in science do not have easy functional equivalents in other domains. 
So there is irony here, but no contradiction.  The knowledge that only fools dance for rain 
in the dry season is a hard won discovery of the scientific study of religion.  The same 
institutions that produced that discovery can help us remember it when we do our work. 
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